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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
IP Justice is an international 501(c)(3) non-profit charitable organization
based the United States. IP Justice has been operating as an international
technology rights and civil liberties organization since 2002. It promotes
Intellectual freedoms and advancement through Internet freedom, innovation
policy, and a balance of intellectual property rights between content holders and
users. IP Justice contends that a free and open Internet is a prerequisite for a robust
democracy and the promotion of innovation, technological advancement, and
economic growth.
Over the last two decades, IP Justice has selectively partnered with Amici
Curiae in to provide courts with unbiased insights on important legal issues.
Additionally, IP Justice participates in international policymaking fora including
the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United
Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). IP Justice has held an accredited
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECSOC) since 2003. The organization has been invited to testify before the U.S.
Copyright Office as part of it’s rulemaking procedures under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). IP Justice has authored numerous academic
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works on the interplay of technology and law with a particular focus on global
issues affecting digital rights and Internet governance.
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I.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Florida Appellants’ appeal of the U.S. District Court’s preliminary
injunction presents two main issues for review:
1.

Whether Florida’s state law S.B. 7072 violates the freedom of
expression guarantees of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution; and

2.

Whether S.B. 7072 is inconsistent with and therefore preempted by 47
U.S.C. § 230.
II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The factual and procedural underpinnings of this action are set forth
adequately in the briefs of the parties herein. In order to provide the Court with
context for the arguments presented, Amicus Curiae sets forth key provisions of
Florida’s S.B. 7072 (occasionally the “Act”) that will be analyzed here.

-3-
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Key Terms of S.B. 7072

The Act includes Florida Statute 501.2041(1)(j) which provides that “a
social media platform may not take any action to censor1, deplatform2, or shadow
ban3 a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or broadcast.”
Florida Statute 106.072(2) states that a social media platform must not
“willfully deplatform a candidate for office who is known by the social media
platform to be a candidate, beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the
date of the election or the date the candidate ceases to be a candidate.”
Florida Statute 501.2041(2)(h) prohibits a social media platform from using
“post-prioritization4 or shadow banning algorithms” for content “posted by or

1

“‘Censor’ includes any action taken by a social media platform to delete,
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend a
right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted by a
user. The term also includes actions to inhibit the ability of a user to be viewable
by or to interact with another user of the social media platform.” Fla. Stat.
§ 501.2041(1)(b).
2

“ʻDeplatformʼ means the action or practice by a social media platform to
permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from the
social media platform for more than 14 days.” Id. § 501.2041(1)(c).
3

“ʻShadow banʼ means action by a social media platform, through any means,
whether the action is determined by a natural person or an algorithm, to limit or
eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to other
users of the social media platform. This term includes acts of shadow banning by a
social media platform which are not readily apparent to a user.” Id.
§ 501.2041(1)(f).

4

“Post-prioritization” means action by a social media platform to place, feature, or
prioritize certain content or material ahead of, below, or in a more or less
-4-
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about a user” who is known by the platform to be a candidate for office. Thus it
compels the publication of speech posted both by and about politicians on
platforms. Florida Statute 501.2041(2)(d) contains additional measures tending to
discourage removing or demoting other speech.5
The statue defines “journalistic enterprise” as those Florida businesses that
meet high thresholds of popularity as measured by content consumption6. “Social
media platform” is broadly defined to cover most types of Internet service
providers, but expressly exempts those that operate a Florida “theme park or
entertainment complex.” Fla. Stat 501.2041(1)(g). The specific types of services
that the Florida statute refers to as “social media platforms” are the same services
that Section 230 describes as “interactive computer services”, this brief will
collectively refer to these as “Platforms.”

prominent position than others in a newsfeed, a feed, a view, or in search results.”
Id., § 501.2041(1)(e).
5

“A social media platform may not censor or shadow ban a user’s content or
material or deplatform a user from the social media platform: 1. Without notifying
the user who posted or attempted to post the content or material; 2. In a way that
violates this part.” Id., § 501.2041(2)(d).
6

The business must publish “in excess of 100,0000 words” online with 50,0000
paid subscribers or 100,0000 active users, publish 100 hours of audio or video with
“at least 100 million viewers annually”, operate a cable channel (with certain
thresholds), or operate under a Federal broadcast license. Id., § 501.2041(1)(d)1-4.
-5-
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S.B. 7072 bars Platforms from exercising their private editorial discretion to
remove, demote, modify, or add content posted by certain privileged users,
“candidates for office” (which are politicians) and “journalistic enterprises” (which
are large media organizations). It creates a complex regulatory scheme for how
ordinary users’ content can be published and for the removal of users from the
Platform. With the exception of content falling within Florida’s obscenity statute
(Fla. Stat. 847.001.), the bar applies irrespective of the Platform’s purpose, be it
disagreement with a particular viewpoint, violation of the terms-of-use agreement,
a particular request by a user, or any reason. The bar on Platform editorial
discretion does not apply to content originating from Florida businesses that do not
meet the statutory popularity thresholds, from individuals, or from businesses
outside of Florida.
III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amicus Curiae urges the Court to uphold the preliminary injunction against
S.B. 7072 as an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression and as
preempted by 47 U.S.C § 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”). S.B. 7072 forces Platforms to publish certain speech, favor certain
speakers, and removes the editorial discretion to refuse, limit, or modulate the

-6-
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same. The purpose of enacting S.B. 7072 as described by the Chief Executive and
legislators was to elevate one political ideology over another.
Despite having some attributes of a public service, Platforms are in fact
private entities and thus have a constitutionally protected right to editorialize and
associate only with those users they choose. Internet users have similar protected
rights. S.B. 7072 removes individual discretion and choice from consumers as to
which viewpoints they wish to consume and instead forces Platforms to accept all
politicians and journalistic enterprises (as those terms are defined) as members and
to publish their speech. In so doing, the regulation inserts the government as an
“uber-moderator” trumping the otherwise agreed-upon standards contained in a
Platform’s terms-of-use, and replacing it with a government edict. S.B. 7072
violates the First Amendment, is unlawful under Section 230 and, will harm the
growing Internet sector of the United States’ economy, and permanently damage
the free and open exchange of ideas on the Internet, unless enjoined.
IV.
ARGUMENT
The importance of safeguarding the constitutionally protected right to free
speech is among the most zealously guarded of our national rights. It is viewed as
indivisibly bound to our identity as a free and open society. As President Harry

-7-
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Truman reported in a Special Message to Congress on the Internal Security of the
United States (Aug. 8, 1950):
“Once a government is committed to the principle of
silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to
go, and that is down the path of increasingly repressive
measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its
citizens and creates a country where everyone lives in
fear.”
Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 486 (11th Cir. 2016) (First Amendment prevents
use of government power to chill or punish speech with which government actor
disagrees.). So important is this fundamental right that Congress and Courts have
created myriad protections as a moat protecting impingent on, or burdening of, this
critical personal right. Among those is Section 230. That complex set of federal
regulations was enacted in great measure to ensure that the then developing virtual
arena of online speech would remain unfettered by government regulation. To
fortify the protection it created, Congress expressly, and broadly, preempted state
regulation in the arena of Internet content regulation.
A.

S.B. 7072 Is A Violation of First Amendment Rights To Freedom
of Expression and Association

It has been well-established for nearly a quarter of a century that the Internet
is the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed and content posted in
that medium is entitled to the highest protection from governmental intrusion.
ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (“Reno”).

-8-
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“As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”
Id., at 885.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the “vast democratic forums of the
Internet” present the “most important place[]… for the exchange of views.”
Packingham v. North Carolina, __ U.S.__, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735, (2017)
(“Packingham”). “[S]ocial media in particular” is entitled to the same First
Amendment protections as other forms of media. Id., at 1735; Matal v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017) (First Amendment prohibits government entities from
abridging freedom of speech). These Constitutional safeguards apply to State
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S.
652, 667-68 (1925).
1.

The Act Constitutes Government Action Against Private
Citizens in Violation of the First Amendment

“The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment constrains governmental
actors and protects private actors.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139
S. Ct. 1921, 1926, 204 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2019) (“Manhattan”). Thus, while the state
may not act as the arbiter of speech, private citizens may. The former is an

-9-
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impermissible government intrusion, while the latter is a zealously safeguarded
right, critical to the orderly exchange of ideas in an open society.
Nor does it matter whether the private actor is an individual, organization,
entity, or corporation; each has an equally important protected speech interest:
“First Amendment protection extends to
corporations. [citations] . . . . [citations] Under the
rationale of these precedents, political speech does not
lose First Amendment protection “simply because
its source is a corporation.” . . . The Court has thus
rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because
such associations are not “natural persons.”
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010), citing
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining
whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals,
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster”).
There can be instances where the line between private and public may be
blurry. This is not one of them. Manhattan is instructive on this issue. There, the
Supreme Court analyzed whether a “public access” cable provider was properly
deemed a government actor (or government-like) and thus subject to First
Amendment restrictions. In finding the entity was private, the High Court
employed the state-action doctrine, which holds that a private entity will only be
considered a state actor when it exercises a function “traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State.” Manhattan 139 S. Ct. at 1926. Justice Kavanaugh
-10-
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explained that the “public access” cable provider failed the test. “Providing some
kind of forum for speech is not an activity that only governmental entities have
traditionally performed… Private property owners and private lessees often open
their property for speech.” Id., at 1930. Agreeing with Judge Jacobs in Hudgens v.
NLRB7, Manhattan held that it “is not at all a near-exclusive function of the state to
provide the forums for public expression, politics, information, or entertainment.”
Id. Noting that different private entities have traditionally provided fora for public
speech (including grocery stores putting up community billboards and comedy
clubs hosting open mic nights), Manhattan reiterates the importance of protecting
private editorial discretion:
“In short, merely hosting speech by others is not a
traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone
transform private entities into state actors subject to First
Amendment constraints. . . ʻThe Constitution by no
means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication
of private property to public use.ʼ Hudgens, 424 U.S. at
519, 96 S.Ct. 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Benjamin Franklin did not have to operate his newspaper
as “a stagecoach, with seats for everyone.” F. Mott,
American Journalism 55 (3d ed. 1962). That principle
still holds true. . . . to hold that private property owners
providing a forum for speech are constrained by the First
Amendment would be “to create a court-made law
wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which

7

424 U.S. 507 (1976).
-11-
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private ownership of property rests in this
country.” [citation].
Id., at 1930-31.
Thus, just as the “public access” providers in Manhattan had no duty to
themselves refrain from content restrictions, so too the Platform owners do not.
See, Manhattan 139 S. Ct. at 1930-1934 (Neither government regulations, use of
government rights-of-way, nor other public communication infrastructure rendered
cable operator a government actor.). To the contrary, consistent with Reno,
Packingham, and Citizens United, the Platforms, as private citizens, enjoy their
own First Amendment protections. This point is particularly important in light of
the existence of contractual, private, terms of use agreements that Platforms enter
into with their users. These private contracts dictate the rules for acceptable
conduct and speech by anyone who wishes to join the Platforms. See Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829 (2012) (upholding enforceability of Facebook’s
website terms of service); Babcock v. Neutron Holdings, Inc., No. 20-60372 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 13, 2020) (upholding enforceability of mobile terms of service). The
result is a private marketplace of accepted norms, which include private content
regulation agreed upon by user and Platform.
The ability for social media platforms to self-regulate the content that is
shared on their environments is vital to the development of a free and open
Internet. (See also Sect. IV.C.) Private content moderation, when used with
-12-
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proper discretion, can protect Internet users from content those users agree is
harmful. For example, Twitter, an online microblogging and social networking
platform that allows users to post their own content and repost the content of
others, has strict regulations against the posting of “hateful conduct”. Twitter’s
published “Safety and Cybercrime” Rules and Policies details what constitutes
“hateful conduct,” the rationale behind the regulation, and the consequences for its
violation.8 Similarly, social media network Facebook, has posted community
standards against any content that promotes or incites violence, criminal behavior,
dangerous individuals or organizations, fraud, deception, and more.9 The absence
of a standardized set of rules across all Platforms (as the Act dictates) allows users
to select whatever Platform and corresponding terms and standards most closely
aligns with the particular user’s beliefs and preferences. The differing community
standards, shared values, and rules itself generates microcosms of speechpromoting habitats.
Just as traditional private businesses are entitled to post rules such as “No
Shirt, No Shoes, No Service” that customers are required to follow if they wish to

8

Hateful Conduct Policy, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/hateful-conduct-policy (Retrieved 31 Oct. 2021).
9
Community Standards, Facebook,
https://m.facebook.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_behavior/
(Retrieved 30 Oct. 2021).
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patronize the business, Internet companies are free to post terms of service
outlining their rules and policies for use including content moderation and
deplatforming. Charudattan v. Darnell, 834 F. App’x 477, 481–82 (11th Cir.
2020). (Deplatforming and blocking plaintiff’s comments from sheriff’s reelection FaceBook page was private, not government action, and thus precluded
First Amendment based 1983 claims).
To be clear, Amicus Curiae does not advocate that this Court (or any branch
of government) should view any particular term of use policy as good or bad.
Precisely the opposite: government should avoid the editorial process entirely.
These forms of private content moderation allow the individual online Platforms to
exercise their free speech rights to control the messaging on their Platforms in a
fashion that they believe will protect the needs of their users. Internet users then
enjoy the freedom to engage with online Platforms that comport to their own
standards of behavior and acceptable speech, selecting which communities with
which they wish to associate and which they do not. This balance aligns with the
First Amendment and Congress’ intention in creating Section 230 to encourage
private content moderation. S.B. 7072 is a government action seeking to undo that
Constitutionally protected form of private editorial discretion.
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The Act Compels Speech in Violation of the First
Amendment

It is well established that “compelling cognizable speech...is just as suspect
as suppressing it, and typically subject to the same level of scrutiny.” Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 480-81 (1997). “[T]he First
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech, a term necessarily comprising the
decision of both what to say and what not to say.” (Riley v. National Federation of
Blind of N.C., Inc. 521 U.S. 457 (1988) (no constitutional significance to
difference between compelled speech and prohibited speech); accord, Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995).
In Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, the
Supreme Court established that “compelling editors or publishers to publish that
which reason tells them should not be published violates the First Amendment
guarantee of a free press” Miami Herald Pub. Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (“Tornillo”). Tornillo analyzed Florida’s
“right of reply” statute that had granted a political candidate a right to equal space
in a private newspaper to answer criticism and attacks on their record. The
Supreme Court struck down the statute as an unconstitutional compulsion of
speech.
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The Tornillo Court explained that the intrusion into the function of the
editors’ selection of content violated the First Amendment.
“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course
includes discussions of candidates . . . The choice of
material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials whether
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of
a free press as they have evolved to this time.”
Id., at 257-258.
Like the Platforms here, Tornillo involved private enterprises engaged in the
communication and content republication business. By providing a private
platform for public discourse, newspapers and social media sites provide similar
press services and have similar press interests including the constitutional right to
control what information and viewpoints are published on their social media
publications. In fact, according to a 2021 Pew Research Center study, about half
of Americans now get their news on social media, nearly a third of Americans
regularly get news on Facebook, and 55% of Twitter users regularly get news on
Twitter.10 Social media sites have become an important source of news and a

10

Pew Research Center. (21 September 2021) “News Consumption Across Social
Media in 2021” [Report].
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platform for public discourse in the Internet age. Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1737.
The enhanced public discourse made possible by the Internet and social media,
which provides an environment in which citizens engage in robust and open debate
on public issues, provides an important democratic function. It adds mightily to
the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S. 254, 270-279 (1964) (government-enforced discourse “dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate”).
Despite the longstanding First Amendment prohibition on compelling
private speakers to publish the unwanted speech of others, S.B. 7072 denies private
Platform owners their right to moderate, censor, deplatform, or shadow ban certain
government-selected users (“candidates for office” and “journalistic enterprises”),
even when the Platform’s owners might find those users’ speech to be
objectionable or in violation of their terms of use. Platforms are required to carry
that speech, lose their editorial discretion, and become publishers for speech that
the government mandates. Worse yet, this government prohibition on private
editorial discretion discriminates between the government’s preferred users and
those not covered by the Act.

https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/09/20/news-consumption-acrosssocial-media-in-2021/
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Our Nation has a strong tradition of eschewing government mandated
viewpoint control. In W. Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S.
624 (1943) the Supreme Court ruled that even statutory compulsion of patriotic
acts (there are requirement to salute the flag) violates the First Amendment. “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” Id., at 642, accord Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)
(Government may not use private license plates “as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the
State’s ideological message” or prohibit individuals from holding or expressing a
different view from the majority).
An Internet that fosters a free and robust exchange of information from
differing viewpoints serves a strong democratic interest that is harmed by the
government’s regulation of speech with S.B. 7072. As the Tornillo Court warned,
governmental regulation of the crucial private editorial process cannot be
consistent with First Amendment guarantees. Tornillo 418 U.S. 241, 257-258.
3.

The Act Prevents Private Choice of Association in Violation
of The First Amendment

The guaranteed right to associate freely is closely connected to the right to
free expression. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the
Supreme Court upheld the right to exclude others from private associations as a
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right afforded by the First Amendment’s guarantee of Freedom of Association. In
Boy Scouts, the Boy Scouts revoked the membership of an assistant scoutmaster
for conduct not in accordance with its membership policies. The scoutmaster sued
under a state accommodations law, claiming that the Boy Scouts could not exclude
him from the association. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the member
could be excluded. The Court explained the state regulation would significantly
burden the organization’s right to oppose certain conduct, holding that “the state
interests … do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to
freedom of expressive association. That being the case, we hold that the First
Amendment prohibits the State from imposing such a requirement”. Id., at 659. In
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 357 U.S. 449 (1958) the Supreme Court ruled
that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.” Id., at 460.
Online communities cultivated by private Platforms are no less of an
association than private clubs, or educational organizations. Florida Statutes
106.072(2), which does not allow politicians to be deplatformed, and
501.2041(2)(j), which does not allow large journalistic enterprises to be
deplatformed, infringe on the right to associate in the same manner ruled
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unconstitutional in BoyScouts and NAACP because it prevents the right to exclude
certain participants and thus precludes the Platforms and their users from their
right to oppose certain viewpoints or expressions. The Platforms have a right to
host, and the users have a right to join, on-line communities with viewpoints,
standards, and beliefs of which they approve11. The First Amendment precludes
the State of Florida from mandating those associations.
4.

The Act Mandates Content, Speaker, and Viewpoint
Discrimination in Violation of the First Amendment

Viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional. As the
Supreme Court explained in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995):
“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate
speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys. [Citations]. Other principles follow from this
precept. In the realm of private speech or expression,
government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another. [Citations]. Discrimination against speech
because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional. [Citations] … Viewpoint
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content
discrimination. The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
11

Nor is the ability for users to block individual speakers any remedy. That
remedy does not allow the online community to self-select its organizational
membership. Just as a private club cannot be prohibited from excluding members
under the theory that members could simply ignore the unwanted persons, so too
individualized online blocking does not remedy the harm here.
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rationale for the restriction. See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry
Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).”
Id., at 828-829 (1995).
Thus, the government “is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects
about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.”
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010).
The Supreme Court explained in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781
(1989) “the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Id., at 791. Content
discrimination is often apparent from the face of the regulation, but Courts may
also consider the stated purpose of legislation where the same demonstrates an
intention to suppress expression. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622,
646 (1994), accord. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564, (2011)
(statements of proponent legislators relevant in confirming content discriminatory
nature of regulation).
The Act expressly targets political speech (speech by or about a candidate
for office) and specific speakers (certain journalistic enterprises and candidates for
office) providing that type and author of content with audience preferences that are
not afforded to other users or other types of content that the government has
chosen not to favor. (See Sect. II.A.) A speech regulation targeted at specific
-21-
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subject matter is content-based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints
within that subject matter. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n of N. Y. 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Similarly, “[s]peech restrictions based
on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content,”
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n 558 U. S. 310, 340 (2010). Thus,
the Act’s terms are content-based.
That conclusion is readily buttressed by the stated intentions of the
proponents of S.B. 7072, which evince the worst of constitutional violations:
viewpoint discrimination. As the District Court below noted, the Florida Governor
and Legislature explained that S.B. 7072 was targeted at “leftist” speech with
which they disagree, and that the Act was intended to elevate “conservative”
speech. Netchoice, LLC, v. Moody 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 121951 (N.D. Fla. June
30, 2021), at pp.24-25. Florida Governor DeSantis’ press release on S.B. 7072
explained the Act was intended to counter viewpoints that “favor . . .the dominant
Silicon Valley ideology.” 12 Legislative Representative Blaise Ingoglia, identified
the Act as necessary because of his views that “our freedom of speech as
conservatives is under attack by the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley. But in

12

Press Release, Ron DeSantis, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, (24 May 2021),
https://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-thecensorship-of-floridians-by-big-tech/
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Florida, [this] … will not be tolerated.” 13 Id. Whether the legislators’ and
Governor's views were correct or not, the intention behind S.B. 7072 was
unquestionably government promotion of a particular viewpoint.
Government regulations of speech that are content-based or speaker-targeted
are subject to the highest, strict scrutiny standard. Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (“laws favoring some speakers over others
demand strict scrutiny.”), Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona 576 U.S. 155 (2015),
Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The State Appellants, here,
cannot meet their burden of showing “that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,” Arizona Free Enterprise
Club PAC v. Bennett 564 U.S. 721 (2011) quoting Citizens United 558 U.S. at 340.
The stated interest of furthering conservative ideology, or undermining
perceived “silicon valley ideology” is not a legitimate state interest. Moreover
even that interest is not necessarily served by the Act, so it cannot be said to be
narrowly tailored. Promoting speech on one side of an issue or restricting speech
on the other, is not a legitimate state interest. Arizona Free Enter. Club v. Barnett
564 U.S. 721, 749-750 (2011).

13

Press Release, Ron DeSantis, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, (24 May 2021),
https://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-thecensorship-of-floridians-by-big-tech/
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Assuming, for arguments sake, that Florida has identified a viewpoint in
need of greater public attention, the answer, is already provided by private
competition. For every MSNBC, there is a Fox News. For every Facebook or
Twitter, whose agreed upon terms of use limit discourse in certain ways, there is a
4chan, 8kun, 8chan14 and the like. Some Platform restrict content in some ways,
some restrict it in other ways, still others do not restrict it at all. This is the beauty
of free enterprise married with strongly enforced rights of Free Expression.
In this Country, governments do not belong in the political speech
moderation business, helping one ideological side or hampering another by
government fiat. That is behavior of authoritarian regimes, not free states
protected by the First Amendment. Because the Act does just that, it must remain
enjoined.
B.

S.B. 7072 Is A Violation of The Communications Decency Act
1.

Congress Enacted Section 230 To Protect Platforms Against
State Laws That Regulate Content Moderation

Section 230 expressly encourages Platforms to moderate content on their
online environments. The Act states “no provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information

14

https://www.cnet.com/news/8chan-8kun-4chan-endchan-what-you-need-toknow-internet-forums/
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provided by another information content provider” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). And
further:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of— any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
These two statutory provisions give broad federal immunity to Platforms
from being held liable for objectionable content shared to their website and
encourages Platforms to moderate content using their own discretion as a form of
protection against users consuming harmful information. S.B. 7072 takes this
editorial right away from Platforms and removes the consumer protection element
intended by Section 230.
Section 230 was enacted to overrule the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 199 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y.Sup.Ct 1995), which held an Internet provider could be held liable for
defamatory statements of users. Medytox Solutions Inc., v. Investorshub.com, Inc.,
152 So. 3d 727, 730 (2014). Congress enacted Section 230 to overrule this
decision and remove the disincentives to self-regulation. Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). Courts have found that in enacting Section
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230 Congress specifically intended “to allow computer service providers to
establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Domen v.
Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 73 (2nd Cir. 2021).
The Congressional Research Service confirms that when Congress
introduced Section 230, members who spoke in favor “argued that it would allow
private parties, in the form of parents and internet service providers, to regulate
offensive content, rather than the FCC”.15 In Attwood v. Clemons the Court
explained that Section 230 “is a part of a larger legislative policy to allow private
social media companies and private users to censor violent or obscene content
from social media without fear of civil liability. Section 230(c)(2). Congress has
chosen to allow private companies and private users to censor.” Attwood v.
Clemons, 2021 U.S. Dist. 49586 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2021) [emphasis in original].
It goes further and states that Congress intended for social media and the Internet
to be unfettered by federal or state regulation. Id. “Congress wanted to encourage
the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to
promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027
(9th Circuit 2003). Section 230 was therefore designed, in part, “to maintain the
robust nature of Internet communication, and to accordingly keep government

15

Valerie Brannon, Eric Holms, Cong. Research Serv., Section 230: An Overview,
(April 7, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46751.
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interference in the medium to a minimum.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
Congress recognized that privatized content moderation provides a safety
check against the spread of harmful information by empowering private parties to
demand that Platforms provide a healthy Internet environment that encourages the
free flow of information while discouraging harmful content. Thus, Section 230
works hand-in-glove with the First Amendment.
2.

Section 230 Preempts State Laws Like S.B. 7072

“The majority of ‘federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish
broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.’” Almeida
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Florida’s Supreme Court too has
recognized the CDA’s broad preemptive effect. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783
So.2d 1010, 1018 (Fla.2001) (Section 230 expressly bars state actions).
Because Congress enacted Section 230 to encourage private parties to
engage in online content moderation and S.B. 7072 prohibits it, the Act must be
enjoined as inconsistent with and thus, preempted by, federal law.
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State Laws Like S.B. 7072 Harm The Growing Internet Sector Of
The United States Economy

U.S. businesses that permit and provide user-generated content represent a
significant and growing portion of the Internet sector of the U.S. economy.
According to a comprehensive study by the International consulting group and
highly ranked think tank16, McKinsey Global Institute, the Internet sector has
greater weight on GDP than agriculture or utilities.17 A primary reason such
businesses have flourished is because of immunities for the speech of others that
Section 230 provides to users and Platforms. According to a 2020 study, by
leading researcher Verified Market Research, the market for user-generated content
software was valued at $90.70 billion in 2019, and is projected to reach $434.03
billion by 2027, growing at a compound annual growth rate of 21.5% from 2020 to

16

“History and Reputation of the McKinsey Global Institute”, ThinkTank Watch,
(16 June 2016), http://www.thinktankwatch.com/2016/06/history-and-reputationof-mckinsey.html
17

James Manyika and Charles Roxburgh, “The Great Transformer: The Impact of
the Internet on Economic Growth and Prosperity”, McKinsey Global Institute,
(Oct. 2011),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/technology%20media%2
0and%20telecommunications/high%20tech/our%20insights/the%20great%20transf
ormer/mgi_impact_of_internet_on_economic_growth.pdf
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2027.18 The study concludes that the possibility of regulation of user-generated
content is one of the main impediments to growth in the market for that sector.
Similarly, an Internet Association study asked American consumers about
features and services most important to them when purchasing online.19 The
survey showed that features and services enabled by Section 230 mattered most to
consumers. Section 230 encourages Platforms to host user-generated content, such
as reviews, by holding speakers, not Platforms, liable for speech they post. Results
showed user reviews offer a sense of safety to sharing-economy customers, many
of whom indicated they would not use the Platform without reviews.
Another study by the Internet Association showed that reducing
intermediary liability safe-harbor protections would cost the U.S. economy about
$44 billion and 425,000 jobs each year.20 It showed companies will face higher

18

“User Generated Content Software Market Size and Forecast”, Verified Market
Research (Sept. 2020), https://www.verifiedmarketresearch.com/product/usergenerated-content-software-market/.
19

Best Of The Internet: Consumers Rely On User-Generated Content, Internet
Association, (25 June 2019), https://internetassociation.org/files/ia_best-of-theinternet-survey_06-26-2019_content-moderation/
20

Christian M. Dippon, Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role of
Liability Protections, NERA Economic Consulting, (5 June 2017),
http://internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Economic-Value-ofInternet-Intermediaries-the-Role-of-Liability-Protections.pdf
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entry costs, limiting innovation, and that without the protections, consumers face
higher costs and a less open and enjoyable online user experience.
The importance of Section 230 to industry and society can also be
demonstrated by turning to countries that do not provide such protections. For
example, a 2021 Malaysian appellate court decision held an online news Platform
liable for the speech of its users who posted comments on a news story about
government corruption in Malaysia.21 Because Malaysia neither provides its
citizenry with protections like those in Section 230, nor those found in our First
Amendment, online news outlet Malaysiakini was fined $124,000 over 5
comments posted by users that the court deemed insulting to the judiciary. Due to
the hefty fine and legal risk of continuing to allow user-generated content on its
platform, the news outlet was forced to go out of business.22 Put simply, where
Section 230 immunities are absent, and government is allowed to dictate speech,
Publishers simply cannot take the financial risk of allowing user-generated content.
Myriad studies and anecdotal evidence buttress the findings of Congress and
of our Courts – maintaining Section 230’s broad immunities and the related First

21

Richard C. Paddock, “5 reader comments just cost a news website $124,000”
THE NEW YORK TIMES (2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/world/asia/malaysia-press-freedomguilty.html (last visited Nov 13, 2021).
22

Id.
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Amendment protections is critical to the growth of the Internet economy. That
economy, among the fastest growing sectors of the U.S. economy is also the “most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed” (Reno, 521 U.S. 864) with its
social media component providing among the “most important places . . . for the
exchange of views.” Packingham v. 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Amicus Curiae urges the Court to uphold the
preliminary injunction against S.B. 7072.
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